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This paper estimates the risk preferences of cotton farmers in Southern Peru, using the
results from a multiple-price-list lottery game. Assuming that preferences conform to two of the
leading models of decision under risk|Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT)|we nd strong evidence of moderate risk aversion. Once we include individual
characteristics in the estimation of risk parameters, we observe that farmers use subjective
nonlinear probability weighting, a behavior consistent with CPT. Interestingly, when we allow
for preference heterogeneity via the estimation of mixture models|where the proportion of
subjects who behave according to EUT or to CPT is endogenously determined|we nd that
the majority of farmers' choices are best explained by CPT. We further hypothesize that the
multiple switching behavior observed in our sample can be explained by nonlinear probability
weighting made in a context of large random calculation mistakes; the evidence found on this
regard is mixed. Finally, we nd that attaining higher education is the single most important
individual characteristic correlated with risk preferences, a result that suggests a connection
between cognitive abilities and behavior towards risk.
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Peru.
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1 Introduction
The study of decisions under risk has been one of the main subjects in economics since at least
Arrow (1971). From a development economics perspective, risk has been considered as a factor that
can slow down the adoption of nancial or production innovations (Feder, 1980; Feder et al., 1985).
It is argued that risk considerations may prevent subjects from undertaking potentially protable
investments. Similar concerns may also encourage subjects to continue using traditional farming
technologies instead of new, more protable technologies because of the uncertainty that may be
involved in their adoption process. Experimental evidence from China for the case of Bt cotton
(Liu, 2008) and India (Binswanger et al., 1980) supports this claim. As a consequence, production
and nancial decisions may result in an underoptimal accumulation of assets, with a deterioration
of one's ability to cope with large shocks in the long run.
Recent evidence from the laboratory (e.g., Hey and Orme, 1994; Holt and Laury, 2002) and
the eld (e.g., Harrison et al., 2007, 2009; Schechter, 2007) suggests that subjects are in general
risk averse over the gains domain.1 On the experimental ground, several methods of measuring
risk preferences exist (for a review of these methods, see Cox and Harrison, 2008), but the multiple
price listing (MPL) is one of the most commonly used.2 Under the MPL format, subjects are given
a menu of choices with ordered prices, one per row. The task is to indicate \yes" or \no" for each
price, and at the end the experimenter implements one of the rows at random, and subjects get
the choice made in that row.
In order to measure risk using the MPL format, choices are binary lotteries and the prices
are given for the probability structure associated with each lottery; thus, in each row, subjects
should decide whether to take one lottery or the other, given the probability that each prize
has within a given lottery. The main attractive feature of the MPL is its simplicity to explain,
implement, and elicit true valuations, a trait that is especially important in a farming context where
a large proportion of the individuals have typically low levels of schooling. This method has also
been found to yield less noise than alternative elicitation methods that attempt to elicit certainty
equivalents, such as: the measurement of willingness to pay in an auction, in which subjects report
a maximum buying price for a lottery; the measurement of willingness to accept in an auction, in
which subjects report a minimum selling price for a lottery; or the Becker et al. (1964) method,
in which subjects report a certainty equivalent for a lottery. (See Hey et al. [2007] for details).
One of the disadvantages of this method, however, is that it allows for multiple switching between
lotteries, a behavior that is not expected from fully rational players. Multiple switching behavior
(MSB) has been reported by previous studies (e.g., Andersen et al., 2006; Bruner et al., 2008; Eckel
1One of the exceptions include Henrich and McElreath (2002), who nd that while Chilean peasants are risk
loving, Tanzanian peasants seem risk averse. They used three binary lotteries, with a safe choice and a risky bet,
with the idea being to use the indierence point between the safe choice and the lottery as a measure of certainty
equivalence value.
2Other methods using nonexperimental data include contingent valuation methods and structural estimation.
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and Wilson, 2004; Holt and Laury, 2002; Jacobson and Petrie, 2009),3 and it has been attributed
to indierence between the two lotteries (e.g., Andersen et al., 2006) or to the lack of salience in
the lottery prizes (e.g., Bruner, 2007).4 However, MSB could also be due to confusion, incomplete
understanding of the game rules, or to the lack of attention due to boredom or hurry.
The typical solution for the multiple switching in MPL designs has been to discard these obser-
vations under the implicit assumption that there is nothing to learn from those seemingly irrational
choices or mistakes. This solution can be understandable when the proportion of such inconsistent
choices is small (as found by most of the previously mentioned studies), but when such proportion
is large (as we found in this paper), then we believe that a more constructive approach would be
to examine whether those inconsistent choices can be rationalized under a particular framework.
Our estimation of the risk parameters will consider the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as the
work horse. We will then generalize EUT to account for the possibility that, instead of objective
probabilities, individuals make subjective distortions to those probabilities in their decisions under
risk. These distortions lead people to underweight or overweight probabilities, a phenomenon ex-
amined by Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), and supported
by substantial experimental evidence (Starmer, 2000).5 An additional appealing feature that mo-
tivates us to consider CPT is that, as we state later in this paper, it can help explain the MSB
observed in our data.
This paper uses data gathered in rural Peru, where we created an experimental economics
laboratory to elicit measures of risk aversion. The experimental sessions were conducted with
small-scale cotton farmers over six weeks in a southern coastal valley, using the MPL format
popularized by Holt and Laury (2002).6 Experimental subjects were asked to choose between a
relatively safe and a relatively risky lottery along ten decision rows (indierence between lotteries
was not an option). Given that a large proportion of our subjects (52 percent) switched back and
forth from one lottery to the other at least twice,7 rather than discarding the observations where
MSB was observed, we will adopt a more constructive approach and will keep them in our sample,
3Andersen et al. (2006) nd that 5.8 percent of their subjects switch multiple times when allowing for indierence
(taken by 24.3 percent of subjects). In Bruner et al. (2008) such proportion is 20 percent; in Eckel and Wilson (2004),
12.9 percent; in Holt and Laury (2002), 13.2 percent in hypothetical choices; and in Jacobson and Petrie (2009), 55
percent.
4In a setting where game instructions are written and displayed on computers, Bruner (2007) nds that reinforcing
verbally that earnings for the risk game would be determined only [added emphasis] for one decision row, signicantly
reduces the proportion of multiple switches.
5Another feature of prospect theory is the concept of loss aversion that states that individuals are more sensitive
to losses than gains of similar magnitude. We do not explore loss aversion in this paper, given that our game is
dened over gains, not losses.
6This research project was carried out in partnership with an insurance company and a vendor of insurance
contracts bundled with loans. At all times, we emphasized our participation as researchers was simply to inform
farmers about the main features of this new nancial product and to examine their willingness to buy it. We also
stressed the fact that participating in these sessions should not make them feel obliged to buy insurance.
7The magnitude of multiple switching is much less in most of the existing experimental studies (5-13 percent
percent in Holt and Laury, 2002; 5.8 percent in Andersen et al., 2006, when the indierent choice is allowed, and
taken by 24.3 percent of subjects). The exception is Jacobson and Petrie (2009), with over 50 percent of Rwandan
subjects making at least one inconsistent choice.
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with the tenet that those choices reect people's preferences and could potentially be rationalized
by probability weighting made in the presence of large random mistakes. Our sample includes 378
experimental subjects, who made a total of 3,780 choices over monetary gains, and were surveyed
to get information about personal and background characteristics that are used as controls in the
empirical analysis. We report the following results.
First, on average subjects exhibit a moderate degree of relative risk aversion, which is consonant
with most of the existing eld experiments eliciting risk preferences. Risk estimates are somewhat
similar regardless of the functional form governing the preferences (we assumed Constant Relative
Risk Aversion|CRRA preferences under EUT and CPT). Moreover, the main individual charac-
teristic that predicts risk preferences is higher education (more educated people are less risk averse);
while age and gender do not play a statistically signicant role in predicting risk aversion. Second,
when we allow the data to be explained by EUT and CPT, where the proportion of subjects be-
having according to each model is endogenously estimated, we nd that 76 percent of the choices or
observations are explained by CPT and 24 percent by EUT, a result that suggests that most of our
subjects do actually make subjective distortions of the underlying probabilities in their decisions
under risk. Again, both groups of subjects are risk averse under this mixture model specication.
Third, since our sample is composed of individuals with typically low levels of schooling, we
could expect a large proportion of them to make mistakes in their lottery choices. Indeed, we
nd evidence of large random errors when subjects calculate the values of the lotteries. These
random errors or mistakes can be attributed to several factors, including the lack of attention to
or understanding of the rules of the game. More interestingly, we explore whether the nonlinear
probability weighting that characterizes CPT provides insights to explain how those mistakes can
be consistent with the MSB we observe in our sample. Contrary to what we expected, we nd that
CPT does not explain MSB.
Lastly, we nd that our risk aversion estimates are signicantly negatively correlated with higher
education. Moreover, risk aversion is positively correlated with nancial literacy for our entire
sample, age (positively correlated), gender (female are more risk averse), and wealth (positively);
however, in the last three cases, the coecients are not statistically signicant at conventional
levels.
This paper contributes to the discussion about decision making under risk in developing coun-
tries. By examining two of the leading theories of decision under risk (EUT and CPT), we provide
novel evidence of various risk preference estimates that will be used later (in Chapter 3) to predict
nancial decisions made in an experimental context.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses several representative
related works. Section 3 reviews the experimental procedures followed in the eld and the data used
in the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the analytical framework used to estimate the relevant
parameters under EUT and CPT and mixing both models. Section 5 presents the estimation results
for the entire sample and examines whether nonlinear probability weighting, in the presence of large
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random errors, can help explain MSB. Section 6 restricts the analysis to the subset of subjects who
correctly chose the higher prize lottery in the last decision row. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Games
In recent years, eld experiments in the economics of development have analyzed a wide array of
topics, applying and adapting laboratory tools to investigate development problems. In a survey
of the literature about experiments conducted in developing countries, Cardenas and Carpenter
(2008) report that the measurement of trust, cooperation, and risk, have been three of the main
topics examined by recent eld experiments.
Pioneered by Binswanger's (1980, 1981) studies in India, experimental economics methods have
since been used to elicit risk preferences in several regions of the developing world. Some of the
most recent experimental works implemented in developing countries include Engle-Warnick et
al. (2007) in Peru, Liu (2008) in China, Tanaka et al. (2009) in Vietnam, and Jacobson and
Petrie (2009) in Rwanda. We will also review the study by Holt and Laury (2002), originally run
with American students, since their method has been widely used in experiments implemented in
developing economies.
Risk experiments are typically run using one of the following two approaches: several choices are
all given at once, from which subjects should choose only one; or the choices are presented using a
multiple price list (MPL) design, in which subjects must choose between two prospects along several
decision rows. In both of these designs, risky prospects can vary in terms of either prizes (keeping
probabilities constant) or probabilities (keeping prizes constant). Now, to get risk estimates, one
can simply compare the expected gains in two consecutive choices|the bounds of the risk intervals
would be given by the values that yield the same value or utility in those two choices under the
desired specication|or one can use econometric techniques to t the choices data (techniques
available include Ordinary Least Squares, interval regressions, and maximum likelihood methods).
Rather than describe in detail the methods used by the previous studies, we will report some
of their main results. Roughly speaking, the methods used can be divided into two groups: those
in which it is the probability of getting the prizes that varies, and those in which the prizes vary
along several decision rows.
In Binswanger's (1980, 1981) studies, Indian subjects were given eight alternatives (each with
a bad luck outcome and a good luck outcome, both equally likely) where a higher expected value
can only be obtained at the cost of having a larger standard deviation. Real and large payos were
used,8 and partial risk aversion (denoted as s) is then measured by computing the indierence points
between any two \ecient" alternatives.9 Binswanger nds that most farmers exhibit moderate
8The highest expected payo in a single decision was higher than an average monthly wage for an unskilled worker.
9The \inecient" alternatives had the same expected return than any two other ecient \alternatives", but had
bigger variances, which should make them unattractive to any risk-averse person. The partial risk-aversion coecient
(s) was computed using the following utility function, dened over game monetary prizes, M : U(M) = (1  s)M1 s.
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partial risk aversion (0:51 < s < 1:19); and that risk aversion tends to increase with higher payos.
Variations of Binswanger's procedure include comparing risky prospects to a \safe" choice, like
the design used by Eckel and Grossman (2008) with American students. These authors use a
ve-alternative Binswanger-like design (with one choice being a sure thing), where the expected
payos increase linearly with their standard deviation (risk). They assume Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA) preferences and get risk estimate intervals by comparing two adjacent choices.
These authors also provide evidence supporting moderate risk aversion. A similar version of the
game was used by Engle-Warnick et al. (2007), with ve risky choices (no sure thing), with
Peruvian farmers. Because this experiment was run with subjects with low levels of schooling,
Engle-Warnick et al. presented each of the ve lotteries in circles split by half (to denote the 50/50
odds) and indicating the prizes in each half of the circle. Interestingly, the authors exploit this
design to measure for ambiguity aversion, in which ve pairs of lotteries with two prizes each are
presented, one with 50/50 odds and the other with the same prizes but with unknown probabilities.
Subjects were asked whether they would choose the uncertain or the risky lottery and how much
they would be willing to pay to avoid facing the uncertain lotteries. This indicator was used to
measure ambiguity aversion, which, unlike their risk aversion indicator (number of risky choices
made), was correlated with a higher likelihood of diversifying crops.
One of the most widely cited papers on measuring risk preferences in the experimental literature
is by Holt and Laury (2002) (henceforth HL). Played with American students, their ten-round
lottery game allows a ner elicitation of risk preferences than in the aforementioned works. In this
design, subjects are given a binary lottery (one relatively risky and the other relatively safe) in
each round. In this multiple pricing list design, the expected value of the safe lottery is greater,
but this relationship reverses as the rounds progress. Thus, even the most risk-averse player should
switch before the tenth round. This switching point provides an estimate of the subject's degree of
risk aversion (the farther they switch in the rounds, the more risk averse they are), which, however,
becomes very noisy when multiple switches are observed. Since there are only two choices available,
only ranges of relative risk aversion can be obtained. Using CRRA preferences to compute those
intervals, Holt and Laury nd that even for (real) low-stake payos (i.e., around $4), players are risk
averse; and most importantly, that the level of risk aversion increases as the (real) stakes increase
(prizes are scaled up by factors of 20, 50, and 90). Even though Harrison et al. (2005b) show that
the risk aversion estimates are upward biased due to order eects (i.e., there is an increase in risk
aversion when payos are higher that is confounded by order eects: players were \experienced"
when they played the high-stake tasks), that last result still holds after controlling for those game
eects.10
The previous studies consider that risk preferences are fully determined by a single parameter.
However, recent experimental evidence suggests that such a picture of reality is incomplete, because
psychological factors also seem to play a role in explaining preferences over the gains domain.
10Subsequent response to Harrison et al.'s critique by Holt and Laury (2005) conrms this nding.
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Unlike Expected Utility Theory (EUT), where risk preferences are completely determined by the
curvature of the utility function, in Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) such preferences are also
determined by the curvature of the probability weighting function, a function that captures such
probability distortions. In particular, there is substantial experimental evidence that subjects tend
to overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities, a fact that would imply that
the probability weighting function is concave for small probabilities and convex for large ones, over
the gains domain (Camerer and Ho, 1994; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Tanaka et al. (2009) is perhaps the rst study to design an experiment with gains and losses in a
developing country (Vietnam in this case) to measure risk preferences. In their design, the authors
enforce monotonicity in preferences by asking subjects the decision row at which they would shift
from one lottery to the other (no switching back and forth was allowed). The risk game design
included 3 series of decision rows (the task is to choose between two binary lotteries, A and B)
with a total of 35 rows. The rst set is composed of 14 rows of a HL-like design, in which only the
higher prize of lottery B increases as one moves down the table and everything else (probabilities
and the other prizes) is held constant; thus, while in the rst row option A has higher expected
value, after row 7 such a relationship reverses. In the second set of 14 rows, the design is the same
as in the rst set, but option A has higher expected value in every row. Finally, in the third set,
each lottery (with 50/50 odds) involves gains and losses. Thus, the rst two sets of rows are used
to obtain intervals of risk aversion and the curvature of the probability weighting function, while
the last set of rows is used to obtain the intervals of the loss aversion parameter. These authors
nd that their Vietnamese subjects are risk averse (and risk aversion is negatively correlated with
education) and that they overweight small probabilities and underweight larger probabilities. In a
similar study, Liu (2008) replicates Tanaka et al.'s method and provides evidence conrming risk
aversion and probability weighting under PT in her sample of Chinese cotton farmers. Liu further
nds that risk averse subjects are less prone to have adopted Bt cotton.
An alternative experimental method to measure risk aversion uses bidding mechanisms. Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak's (Becker et al., 1964) (henceforth BDM) procedure allows elicitation of cer-
tainty equivalent values of lotteries (CE) in two stages. In the rst stage, a subject is endowed with
a lottery gain prospect that oers a prize G with probability q. In the second stage, the subject
is asked to set a minimum selling price, wtpi, for that lottery. Then, a buying price (p
b) for that
lottery is randomly drawn. If the buying price exceeds the selling price (pb > wtp), the subject
gets pb; otherwise, he has to play the lottery. Risk aversion coecients can then be measured for
each response comparing the CEs and the expected values of the lotteries (prizes).11 Varying the
lottery prizes, the sensitivity of risk aversion to scale eects can further be examined. While BDM
may be used to elicit true valuation provided that the independence axiom of EUT holds, the risk
aversion estimated under this procedure has been reported to be very sensitive to the experimental
conditions (Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008). Kachelmeir and Shehata's (1992) paper using the BDM
11More clearly, risk aversion coecients under CRRA preferences would be determined by solving 1  [ ln q
lnCE lnG ].
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procedure in their study for China illustrate some of the diculties faced using this method to
measure risk aversion.12
While a substantial eort has been spent to use dierent techniques to estimate risk (and
time) preferences, little is still known about the relationship between economic preferences and
cognitive skills. Despite this, a few remarkable results seem to consistently emerge: in general,
such preferences are signicantly correlated with cognitive abilities, in the sense that subjects with
better cognitive skills tend to be more likely to take risks (Benjamin et al., 2006; Burks et al.,
2009; Dohmen et al., 2007; Frederick, 2005). In the same vein, little research has been done to
analyze the correlation between elicited preferences and economic decisions, an issue that is crucial
in development economics. One of these works, focused on a developing country (Rwanda), is by
Jacobson and Petrie (2009), who examine whether risk preferences are correlated with nancial
decisions made in real life, and the role that randomness plays in risky decisions. In their 5-row
lottery game, the authors nd that risk averse subjects are more likely to taking out a formal loan.
However, once they control for the probability of making mistakes in the lottery game, risk aversion
also turns signicant as a predictor of being member of a savings group (positive sign) and taking
out informal loans (negative sign). Further, for those who are more likely to make mistakes, such
relationship is reversed. This result, the authors maintain, implies that those who are more likely
to make mistakes also tend not to choose optimally or are excluded from savings groups. In another
work, Guiso and Paiella (2007) nd that their (survey) measure of risk aversion is correlated with a
lower probability to move from one region to another, to change a job, and even to have a chronic
disease.
In this paper, we adopt the approach of tting several functional forms to our risk data with the
expectation that once we unravel true preferences, they will be correlated with real life economic
decisions. The analysis of these issues is deferred to Chapter 3, which examines the link between
risk preferences and nancial decisions in Peru.
3 Experimental Procedures
This section describes the sampling design, reports the main characteristics of our experiment
participants, and discusses the experimental procedures followed in our artefactual eld risk exper-
iment (using the terminology coined by Harrison and List, 2004); that is, we designed a conventional
laboratory experiment, which was conducted with farmers in Peru, a nonstandard subject pool.
Chapter 3 will discuss the results of a dierent experiment, a framed eld experiment, conducted
with the same subjects.
12Other indicators of experimental risk aversion may be the amount bet in a gamble with varying amounts of bets
and expected returns, one choice being not to gamble at all. Schechter's (2007) risk game in Paraguay uses this
method and nds an average lower bound of 0.8 when dening utility only over the risk game winnings, and an
average lower bound of about 2 when utility is dened over income and winnings from the risk game.
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3.1 Recruitment of Subjects
The experimental sessions were held in several zones of the Province of Pisco, a valley located in
the Department of Ica, in coastal Peru.13 A map of the Pisco valley is shown on the left panel of
Appendix A, while a map of Peru is displayed on the right panel. With a total of 3,600 producers,
owning 24,000 hectares, the agricultural production in Pisco is heavily concentrated on a single
crop: cotton. Cotton production concentrates about 45 percent of the total sown area in Pisco
(about 11,000 hectares), and about 77 percent of all Pisco agricultural producers grow cotton. The
average size of a cotton parcel is 3.8 hectares, and the typical farm comprises 6.6 hectares in total
(gures as of 2007-2008). This small-scale production is mostly the result of the Peruvian Agrarian
Reform carried out in the nineteen seventies, where a military government expropriated the land
from the landlords and redistributed it to farmers. Agricultural production is greatly concentrated
in three Districts|Independencia, Humay, and San Clemente|as shown in Appendix A, where
the dark area on the left panel depicts the agriculture parcels.
We conducted 24 experimental sessions in 12 dierent locations across the Pisco valley. These
sessions were held in locations where electricity was available and enough room to host 25-30 persons
was ensured. In all of the cases, farmers were familiar with the locations chosen|public schools,
private houses, a church eatery, and municipal auditoriums. Whenever possible, we found locations
that were focal points to the majority of the selected farmers. However, we had to hold several
sessions in locations with very scattered households, and with very little or no access to public
transportation, where the two conditions mentioned earlier|electricity and space|were met.14
Given that surface water for irrigation is a crucial factor in Pisco, the agricultural area is
divided into 42 Irrigation Blocks, which are overseen by 20 Water Irrigation Commissions (WICs).
Every WIC controls irrigation water administration and use, which is closely supervised by the
Junta de Usuarios, an entity that operates as the superintendent of water administration in the
valley. We relied on information from the Junta de Usuarios of Pisco to implement our sampling
procedure. We selected our subjects using two-stage stratied sampling. In the rst stage, on the
basis of 40 Irrigation Blocks (two were dropped because of their small acreage), we constructed 23
conglomerates with the following criteria: to have a minimum of 600 hectares and a maximum of
1,500 hectares of cotton in total, and to be geographically adjacent. We then randomly chose 13
conglomerates, having a total of 1,604 farmers. In the second stage, to carry out the individual-
level randomization, nearest-neighbor farmers with respect to farm size were broken down into
pairs within each of those 13 conglomerates, and one member of each pair was randomly chosen
to participate in our experiment. The nal sample size consisted of 804 farmers, spread along 12
WICs.
Invitations to attend the experimental sessions were sent out for all of those farmers, 745 of
13The political division of Peru includes: regions, departments (akin to a U.S. state), provinces, and districts. The
Peruvian territory comprises 24 departments and a Constitutional Province, Callao (our main port).
14In one (extreme) case, a farmer told us he walked for 45 minutes (one way) to get to the session. The only means
to get to his house was by riding a horse or a motorcycle.
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whom were reached by our messengers.15 In order to deliver the invitations, we hired the sectoristas
de riego, persons in charge of the water administration, in each WIC because of their familiarity with
farmers (where they have parcels and live). Invitations were personalized and included information
about the experimental sessions (date, location, time), the promise of 7 Soles for just showing up,16
and an estimate of their winnings for participating in the sessions (between 10 and 30 Soles, or
between $3.6 and $10.7). Farmers were also told to bring their invitations to the session as a way
of checking their identity. We had 410 experimental subjects come to the sessions, 399 of whom
stayed until the end of the risk games.17 The core of our analysis will be based on 378 subjects for
whom we have information on most of the variables examined.
The entire experimental sessions were conducted in Spanish. Each experimental session was
composed of six parts, conducted in the following order: entry survey, farming games (the design
and results from these games are discussed in Galarza [2009]), risk game, exit survey, a short video
produced by the insurance company advertising the new insurance product, and a brief lecture on
valley-wide insurance (charla). During the charla, questions about any unclear issues during the
sessions were answered.
3.2 Characteristics of Participants
Participants in our experimental sessions are on average older than 50, mostly male, and have
typically completed only elementary school (which takes six years in Peru), as shown in Table
B.1 in the Appendix. In terms of their farming activity, almost all of them own the parcels they
work on, and the typical farmer reports owning almost 6 hectares in total, a gure that is slightly
smaller than the average size of the farm reported at the valley level (6.6 hectares). The size of the
cultivated land is 5 hectares. Moreover, 82 percent of experimental subjects planted cotton in the
last farming season (2007-2008), obtaining an average yield of 47 quintals (or 2,162 Kilograms) per
hectare.18 Subjects also report extensive experience managing their own agricultural parcels (an
average of 24 years). Compared to subjects who did not attend but were invited to the sessions,
participants do not have statistically signicant dierences in terms of the total owned area, total
sown area, or area sown with cotton,19 a result that provides evidence that no sample selection
15The remaining 59 subjects were not at home when our messengers repeatedly visited their households, because
they were working far from home and could not be reached, or they had simply moved out of town.
16In most of the cases, this fee was sucient to pay for round-trip travel from subjects' houses to the locations
where sessions were held. In some instances, however, no public transportation was available, and producers could
only ride their own motorcyles, horses, or walk.
17Explanations for this seemingly low participation rate include: scattered households, poor explanation of the
incentives for participating, higher opportunity cost (probably non-pecuniary), unclear explanation or comprehension
of the benets from attending the sessions. Farmers in this valley have low participation rates for any meeting
organized, even by the same WIC, excluding the ones related to irrigation water use.
18According to ocial statistics, the valley-wide average yield in 2005 and 2006 was 47 and 42 quintals per hectare,
respectively. No ocial statistics for 2007 were reported at the time of writing this paper. One quintal is equivalent
to 46 Kilograms.
19These are the only variables available to look for selection in the sample who showed up for the experiments.
This comparison was done using information from the Junta de Usuarios de Riego de Pisco for the 2007-2008 farming
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would seem to exist.
Our sample is mainly composed of poor farmers, judging by the self-reported value of their as-
sets (20,000 Soles, or roughly US$7,000, including house and land, but only 6,900 Soles considering
land alone20). With 80 percent of the subjects being owners of the houses they live in, the average
value of a house is 16,300 Soles. In addition to their lack of access to formal insurance mechanisms,
individuals in our sample report being widely exposed to external shocks that aect their agricul-
tural production, as well as to individual shocks (mainly injuries or illnesses), and robbery, that
aected their farming activities. Furthermore, the majority of subjects (61 percent) report having
access to credit markets. This access to credit is concentrated in the formal sector (39 percent),
followed by the informal sector (34 percent), and the cotton gins (27 percent).
In terms of their participation in local organizations, 29 percent of the respondents belong to
a farmer's association and 39 percent have ever played a role as some type of local authority (this
includes any participation in the Water Irrigation Commission). However, more than reecting a
selection of more active people in our sample, this relatively great presence of local leaders could
simply reect the high degree of involvement of farmers in their communities, since this variable
considers any type of involvement in local organizations.
We further obtained information about how informed farmers were about any type of insurance
before starting the experiments and how much they learned during the experiments. The typical
participant in our experiments has only a basic knowledge of any type of insurance. We will get
back to this subject in Chapter 3, when we will examine information contained in the bottom panel
of Table B.1.
3.3 Experimental Sessions
In all of our 24 conducted sessions, participants were assigned to numbered seats at random upon
arrival, and received a binder containing the experiment worksheets and a pencil to record their
choices. We divided the participants into a maximum of four \valleys" with a minimum of 3
members in each one. Splitting the experimental subjects into several valleys allowed us to have
closer monitoring and to accelerate the tasks. Two persons were in charge of each valley. A senior
assistant, well versed in the game rules and procedures, recorded the choices of players, and a helper
assisted with the implementation of the randomizing device used to pick the decision for play (dice
rolling) in each valley. The experiment instructions were read aloud to all participants as a group.
To ensure that farmers understood the mechanics and rules of the games, we allowed them to ask
questions during the presentation of the instructions. Game winnings and attendance fees were
paid at the end of the entire experimental session, which lasted on average ve hours. The total
game winnings from both types of experiments ranged between 11 and 30 Soles, with an average
of 20 Soles. These winnings compare well with a daily unskilled wage (jornal) of 15 to 20 Soles at
season.
20Farmers were asked to self-report their rental value of land, which can be considered a lower bound of the land
value.
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the time of running the games. Winnings from the risk game, which lasted an average of half hour,
averaged 3 Soles, with a minimum of 0.15 Soles and a maximum of 5.75 Soles.
3.4 The Risk Game
We used a relatively simple game to measure risk aversion introduced by Holt and Laury|HL
(2002), in which players chose between a relatively safe lottery (which we call option Sol) and a
relatively risky lottery (which we call option Luna) along ten decision rows. In this design, lotteries'
characteristics in row t are as follows: Sol : (t=10,1800; 1400), and Luna: (t=10,3500; 90). That is,
as shown in Table 1 below, in the rst row (i.e., for t = 1), subjects choosing lottery Sol have a 10
percent chance (prob = 1=10) of getting 1,800 Soles and a 90 percent ([1  prob] = 9=10) chance of
getting 1,400 Soles. Similarly, if they choose lottery Luna, there is a 10 percent chance of getting
3,500 Soles, and a 90 percent chance of getting 90 Soles. In the second row, there is a 20 percent
chance of getting the higher prize in each lottery, and so on.
Table 1: Matrix Payo in the Risk Experiment
Note that in this design prizes are held constant across the decision rows and we vary only the
probabilities of the higher and smaller prizes in each row. Also, the probabilities of each prize in a
given row are the same for both lotteries, so that subjects would focus on the changes in probabilities
(the higher prize in each lottery increased its probability) across rows. As a result, the dierence in
the expected values of the lotteries decreases as subjects move down in the decision rows, as shown
in column 10 of Table 1, where we also see the risk intervals associated with switches made at every
decision row (columns 11-12), as well as the risk categories associated with each interval (column
13), which is based on the mid-point interval in each row. Thus, only risk loving subjects would
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choose the lottery Luna in the rst decision rows, while only risk averse subjects would choose the
lottery Sol in the last decision rows. In turn, risk neutral subjects would switch from choosing
lottery Sol to lottery Luna in row 5, when the expected values of both lotteries are about the same.
This switching point from the safe to the risky lottery provides an estimate of subjects' degree of
risk aversion (the farther they switch in the rounds, the higher the risk aversion, as shown above).
In this design, subjects could start by choosing the lottery Luna in the rst row (if they were highly
risk seeking) and stick to it until row ten (in which case they would be innitely risk seeking), or
switch to lottery Sol before that. Note that this design does not prevents switching back and forth
(from Sol to Luna or viceversa).21
The risk game was implemented as follows (the experiment instructions are provided in Ap-
pendix C): we rst showed subjects the prizes associated with each lottery, the task involved (i.e.,
choose one of those lotteries along ten decision rows), and the way they could win those prizes.
We next showed the prizes in decision row 2, putting emphasis on the probabilities associated with
each of the prizes for both lotteries. Then, we showed the prizes in decision row 8 and proceeded
likewise. We then displayed rows 2 and 8 together in order to show the symmetry in probabilities
of the bigger and smaller prizes: while in row 2, there is a 20 percent chance of getting the higher
prize in each lottery, in row 8 such odds are 80 percent. Figure 1 shows the slide shared with our
experimental subjects at this point.
Figure 1: Risk Experiment: Characteristics of Rows 2 and 8
We next projected a slide containing all the decision rows, and showed subjects the pattern
of increasing probability of getting the higher payos and the resulting decreasing probability of
getting the lower prizes in both lotteries as one goes down in the table. The explanation of the
game ended with a mention of the last row, when the monitor said that subjects will get the higher
prize for certain in each lottery, so that the choice would be between 1,800 if they choose Sol and
21Two other critiques to this procedure follow (Harrison et al., 2005a): it only elicits intervals of risk aversion, and
it can be vulnerable to framing issues, since subjects may be drawn to some focal choice picking (e.g., switching at
the middle of the table). Although renements have been suggested to overcome those potential obstacles|oering
more choices to subjects withing each interval, and randomizing the order of the lottery choices|such methodological
improvements may have come at a high cost: most likely, the resulting higher complexity would have overwhelmed
our subjects.
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3,500 if they choose Luna. In Appendix D we provide a sample worksheet used in the experiment.
To sum up, the main factors we asked farmers to consider in making decisions were the minimum
and maximum payos within each lottery, and the likelihood of those payos in each decision row.
Also, by showing them all the decision rows rather than one by one sequentially, we wanted them
to see the decreasing probability pattern of the lower payo in each lottery. Despite the fact that
we explained this, a large proportion of subjects (105 out of 378) chose the safe lottery in the
last round, which clearly denotes lack of attention or understanding of the game. These mistakes
could in turn be due to fatigue, as the risk game was played after an intensive section of farming
experiments.
After the explanation of the game procedures and rules, subjects played a practice game, in
which they selected their preferred lotteries along ten decision rows, and learned how to calculate
their winnings in real Soles, but did not earn money in cash. They thus learned that their winnings
would be determined by only one decision row, chosen at random in each valley by rolling a ten-
sided die (row for play), and that their specic winnings in game Soles would correspond to the
prize associated in the option chosen in the row for play with the number resulting in a second,
individual die roll. To make it clear, if, for example, the rst die roll for the valley of certain
subject landed on the number 5 (i.e., the fth row will be played), and if this subject's second die
roll landed on the number 6, she would win 1,400 game Soles if she chose lottery Sol in row 5 and
90 game Soles if she selected lottery Luna. Immediately after practicing the game, subjects played
the game for real, following the same rules, and having an exchange rate of 1 Sol in cash for every
600 game Soles.
4 Structural Estimation of Risk Parameters
In this section, we will describe the estimation procedures used to measure risk preferences, rst
assuming that the data are entirely generated by one model (either Expected Utility Theory [EUT]
or Cumulative Prospect Theory [CPT]), and then using a mixture model that allows to estimate
simultaneously the risk parameters under each model, in addition to the proportion of subjects who
are best described by EUT and by CPT. The estimation is done using the maximum likelihood
method,22 and in every case we will correct the standard errors for clustering at the individual level,
in order to account for the possibility that choices made by the same individual are correlated across
decision rows. We will analyze 378 subjects' decisions made over monetary gains along 10 decision
rows, which makes a total of 3,780 choices.23
22The estimation was done in Stata. The algorithm used was the BFGS (Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, Shanno).
The codes were graciously shared by Glenn Harrison from the University of Central Florida (UCF).
23However, when we include individual characteristics as covariates, the sample size shrinks to 365 subjects with
3,650 choices, due to missing information.
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4.1 Assuming Expected Utility Theory
As is typical under EUT, we will assume that the utility of income from outcome j 2 f1; 2g in
lottery k 2 fSol (S); Luna (L)g that individual i 2 f1; :::; Ng gets, denoted by Mk;ji , is dened by







; reui 6= 1; (1)
Note that since the prizes are constant across rows in every lottery (see Table 1 above), no row
index is needed forMi. In this specication, risk aversion is completely determined by the curvature
parameter, reui , with r
eu
i = 0 denoting risk neutrality; r
eu
i > 0, risk aversion; and r
eu
i < 0, risk
seeking behavior. Recall that in our risk game, each lottery k in row m has two possible outcomes,
each with probability pjm. Then, when confronted with a binary lottery, farmers are assumed to




pjm  U(Mk;ji ); (2)




i;m   EULi;m + i; (3)
where i denotes the errors made by subject i (as a result of carelessness, hurry, or insucient
motivation) in the process of calculating the expected utilities,24 which will be assumed to be white
noise (i.e., with mean zero25 and constant variance). This additive error was rst proposed by
Fechner (1860/1966), and we will refer to them as \Fechner errors."26 The prior function can be
interpreted as the perceived advantage of lottery S over lottery L, while such function excluding
the error term represents the true advantage of lottery S over lottery L. Appealing to the Central
Limit Theorem, we can assume that i is also normally distributed:
i  N(0; 2i): (4)
We will further assume that errors are uncorrelated across decision rows. In this Fechner error
story, a careful individual i would have a relatively small error or noise,27 represented by a small
standard deviation (i), in her decisions. On the other hand, when i becomes large, her decision
24For a discussion about the dierent stages at which randomness can play a role in the decision making in lotteries,
see Loomes et al. (2002).
25This means that respondents are assumed not to have left or right bias in their answers.
26This error type was also used by Hey and Orme (1994). A popular alternative error type, due to Luce (1959), is
succintly examined in Appendix F. Preliminary results suggest that the main qualitative results hold assuming either
Fechner errors or Luce errors.
27The terms noise, error, and mistake are used interchangeably throughout the text.
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would respond less to the dierences in subjective values and more to randomness.
For estimation purposes, under the assumption made in eqn.[4], we will use a probit linking
function to transform the latent index given by eqn.[3] (which has a value between 1) into a
binary variable that denotes the observed choices. Thus, the probability that S is chosen over L
will be:
















where the expression in the last parenthesis has a standard normal distribution, and will be referred





Thus, (SEUi;m) denotes the probability of choosing lottery S, and [1   (SEUi;m)] rep-
resents the probability of choosing lottery L. By the symmetry of the normal distribution, the last
expression is equivalent to ( SEUi;m). To be clear, lottery S would be chosen when EUi;m > 0
or (SEUi;m) > 0:5; otherwise, lottery L would be selected. We will use the prior eqn. in the
optimization routine to estimate the risk parameter, ri, and the standard deviation of the noise,
i . Then, individual i
0s contribution to the model's likelihood can be written as:
Leui (r
eu
i ; i ; I
m






  ( SEUi;m)1 Ii;m ; (7)
where Ii;m is an indicator variable of the choice made by individual i in row m 2 f1; :::; 10g, which
takes the value of 1 when lottery S is chosen in row m, and 0 otherwise. Xi is a vector of individual
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Imi ) + ln(( SEUi;m)1 Imi )

: (8)
Note that the inclusion of a vector of covariates (Xi) in the likelihood functions above allows the
estimation of subject specic parameters (including the standard deviation of the error, i), where
we consider the parameter to be a linear function of the covariates. Doing so permits to unveil the
existence of heterogeneity at the parameter level, in contrast to other sources of heterogeneity, such
as heterogeneity at the preference functional level (which is analyzed in section 4.3, by estimating
nite mixture models). Obviously, if we do not include such covariates in the parameter function,
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we will simply estimate an aggregate parameter for the entire sample.
In the case of the risk parameter, we will include covariates to estimate subject-specic parame-
ters whenever it is possible in this and the other specications considered later on (prospect theory
and mixture models). In particular, ri will be estimated as a linear function of dummy variables of
gender, age, education, and geographic location (we label this as the heterogeneous agents case):bri = br(Xi):
bri = br0 + brage Agei + brgender Genderi + bredu  Educationi + brgeog Geog:Locationi; (9)
which will allow us to examine how idiosyncratic risk preferences are. Clearly, not including indi-
vidual characteristics would yield estimates only for a representative subject, which we label as the
homogeneous agent case: bri = br0. Similarly, we will estimate heteroskedastic random errors below,
but with a restricted set of individual characteristics. Similarly, when no covariates are included in
the regression, we would be estimating an aggregate standard deviation of the errors for the entire
sample: bi = b0.
4.2 Assuming Cumulative Prospect Theory
As mentioned in the Introduction of this paper, unlike EUT that can be entirely dened by the
curvature parameter, Tversky and Kahneman (TK)'s (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
adds two psychological features: the notion that losses are more heavily felt than gains of similar
magnitude (loss aversion); and the notion that subjects make subjective assessments that distort
the probabilities of lotteries in evaluating prospects (nonlinear probability weighting). Since our
risk game considers only gains (not losses), we can only test the existence of risk aversion and
whether subjects underweight and overweight probabilities in making risky choices. Further note
that the utility function, renamed by TK as value function, is dened over gains and losses from
the lottery game; not over terminal wealth. Gains and losses are, in turn, dened with respect to
a reference point, which is usually assumed to be the status quo, or the current level of wealth.
We will adopt this approach, thus dening gains as a situation better than the status quo and
losses, as a situation that is less favorable than the status quo. Further, we will continue to assume








; rpti 6= 1: (10)
In CPT, instead of probabilities, we have decision weights, dwj(p), associated with each of
the two outcomes in lottery k. Dened over the cumulative probabilities,28 these decision weights
28Dening the decision weights over the cumulative density instead of the probability outcomes helped CPT avoid
the stochastic dominance problem that aected the original Kahneman and Tversky's (KT) (1979) Prospect Theory
(PT). Under the original PT, subjects could choose a stochastically dominated lottery.
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reect the subjective distortion of probabilities that has been found by several previous studies (e.g.,
Camerer and Ho, 1994; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999), and which can explain why the same subjects
can be risk averse over some prospects (i.e., buying insurance), while being risk loving over some
others (e.g., gambling). Thus, when given a binary lottery k to choose, subjects are assumed to




dwjm(p)  U(Mk;ji ) = dw1m(p)U(Mk;1i ) + dw2m(p)U(Mk;2i ); (11)
where dwjm(p) at every decision row is given by:
dwjm(p) =
(
1 w(p2m), for j = 1
w(p2m); for j = 2
; (12)
and the weighting function, w(pjm), will be represented by:
w(pjm) =
(pjm)h
(pjm) + (1  pjm)
i1= ,  > 0 (j = 1; 2), (13)
where w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. This one-parameter function was proposed by Quiggin (1982)
and popularized by TK (1992). Looking at eqns.[11] and [12] we see that CPUk is the sum of
two rank-dependent outcomes, where dierent weights are given to dierent utilities of outcomes.
Note also that the decision weights in eqn.[12] add up to one, since this function is dened over
the cumulative density function. This specication overcomes the potential problem that nonlinear
weighting can cause violations of stochastic dominance (Fox and Poldrack, 2009). Further note that
under Cumulative Prospect Theory, there are two sources of risk aversion: the curvature of the
utility function, dened by rpt, and the parameter of the probability weighting function,  (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). Thus, for a given curvature of the value function, risk aversion is reinforced
by underweighting of middle to large probabilities and oset by overweighting of small probabilities
(Fox and Poldrack, 2009). We will explain what we mean by overweighting and underweighting
next, when we examine the dierent shapes that TK's weighting function can yield, depending on
the value of the curvature and elevation parameter, :29
(i) If 0 <  < 1; then w(p) would have an inverse S-shape, implying that subjects overweight small
probabilities (concave section, where w(p) > p) and underweight large probabilities (convex
section, where w(p) < p).30 Examples of this case are depicted by the solid and dot-dashed
29The notion of elevation in the weighting functions becomes relevant with the estimation of two-parameter func-
tions. In such case, elevation refers to the attractiveness to gambling (or a higher weight assigned to the larger prize
in our context). For more details, see Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Popular weighting functions include Rieger and
Wang's (2006), Prelec's (1998), and Lattimore et al.'s (1992). We will introduce Prelec's function in Appendix F.
30Underweighting (overweighting) happens when subjects behave as if the chances of occurring a given outcome
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curves in Figure 2.
(ii) If  = 1, then w(p) = p, and we would be back to the EU framework with linear probabilities;
this case is represented by the 45 degree line in Figure 2.
(iii) If  > 1, then w(p) will have a S-shape, with convexity for small and moderate probabilities
and concavity for larger probabilities. An example of this case is depicted by the dashed
curve in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Subjective Weighting Function














While TK's (1992) weighting function has shown to t well the data by several empirical studies,
it is not without drawbacks. In particular, it is not increasing in p for small values of ,31 and it
does not have axiomatic foundations. While the former limitation does not represent a practical
problem for us (since we generally nd estimates of  greater than 0.3, as we will see in the next
section), the latter implies that TK's function, as well as other ad hoc functions (such as Lattimore
are lower (greater) than they actually are.
31Simulations show that such a function is partially decreasing for   0:278, although for greater values of , such
a problem does not seem to exist (see Rieger and Wang, 2006).
19
et al.' s [1992]), could not t data from subjects who reduce simple compound lotteries (Luce,
2000).32
Similar to the EUT case, in order to get estimates of the risk and weighting parameters under
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where the new choice rule, CPUi;m, is given by the sign of the following expression:
CPUi;m = CPU
S
i;m   CPULi:m + i; 33 (15)






To account for individual heterogeneity, the parameters rpti and i will be estimated, whenever
is possible, as linear functions of the individual characteristics, Xi, using the specication shown in
eqn.[9]. We will proceed similarly with the estimation of i when we consider the heteroskedastic
case.
4.3 Mixture Model Specication
In this section, we will move one step forward towards a more accurate depiction of the true but
unknown underlying risk preferences, by allowing for heterogeneity at the functional form level. So
far, we have assumed that a single decision model, either EUT or CPT, explains the preferences
of all subjects. In other words, we assume that all the observations are explained by the same
underlying mechanism or decision rule. However, it is plausible to think that dierent groups of
subjects may exhibit distinct risk preferences (i.e., they may be explained by dierent underlying
mechanisms). Whether we can distinguish heterogeneity in risk preferences in our sample is an
empirical question that can be addressed via the estimation of nite mixture models.34 While we
could endogenously estimate the number of groups that behaves according to dierent models,35
we will consider here only two latent potential types: those whose choices are consistent with
32Reduction of compound lotteries states that an individual should be indierent between two lotteries with the
same probability of winning and the same prize for winning. In notational terms, ((x; p; y); q; y)  (x; pq; y)), where
x and y are prizes and p and q are probabilities.
33Note that this stochastic variable, , has the properties indicated in eqn.[4].
34Harrison and Rutstrom (2009), Conte et al. (2008), and Bruhin et al. (2007), provide evidence supporting
heterogeneity in preferences using these mixture models.
35There is little to gain from doing so, given that our sample size is relative small. The reader interested in learning
this method may consult McLachlan and Peel (2000).
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utility maximization with linear probabilities (labeled as EUT-type), and those whose choices are
consistent with nonlinear probability weighting (labeled as CPT-type).
Thus, in order to estimate a two-component mixture model, we sum the likelihood of each
group, denoted by Leui () and Lpti () and shown in eqns.[7] and [14]), multiplied by its respective
mixing proportion, eu and pt = 1  eu. These proportions denote the probability that the EUT
(CPT) model is the correct specication for a given observation. We could think of eu as the
unobservable proportion of subjects who do not distort probabilities when making risky choices,
while pt captures the unobservable proportion of subjects distorting probabilities in a nonlinear
way. And what the mixture model estimation does is to cluster the observations into two groups









i ; i; 
eu; eui ; 
pt
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; Imi ; Xi) =
NX
i=1
ln [(eu  Leui ()) + ((1  eu)  Lpti ())] ;
(17)
the mixing proportions are estimated together with the risk and weighting parameters and the
noise corresponding to each model.36 The econometrics behind the mixture models is similar to
that of the unobserved exogenous regime switching models, with the (unobserved) probability of
belonging to either one of those regimes being exogenous to the calculation errors. Note that
in our case one regime (the EUT model) is nested in the other (the CPT model), but clearly
the way that probabilities are perceived and assessed under those models or regimes is markedly
dierent. It should be therefore clear that this estimation method is not equivalent to assume that
CPT explains all the data and then just estimate the weighting function parameter, i, for every
individual i and subsequently test whether such estimate is equal to 1 or not: while in the mixture
model specication we assume that the population is composed of two homogeneous subpopulations
(EUT-type and CPT-type subjects), here we would be assuming that the population is composed
only of CPT-type subjects.
Further note that in the same spirit as we did for the heteroskedastic errors case estimated
earlier (i.e., when i = [Xi]), we could also estimate the unobservable mixing proportions as a
linear function of individual characteristics (i.e., i = [Xi]). It is in this case where the similarity
of mixture models with the switching regression models becomes more transparent.37
36It is worth mentioning that we are estimating an aggregate noise here for each model. We could also work on a
heteroskedastic specication, but given our sample size it is likely that the estimation will not converge. Estimating a
common noise for both models yields similar risk estimates, but with a lower weighting function parameter estimate.
37Note the similarity to express the problem above in the exogenous switching regression context (Maddala, 1983):
Regime 1: yi = X1i1 + 1i with probability i
Regime 2: yi = X1i2 + 2i with probability (1  i);












, where yi is a binary variable, and 1 (2) denotes the parameter
estimate under EUT (CPT).
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5 Risk Estimation Results
In this section, we report the maximum likelihood estimates assuming Normal Fechner errors with
a standard deviation () that is also estimated (sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). We further examine
whether nonlinear probability weighting in the presence of large random mistakes or errors can
explain the multiple switching behavior observed in our data (section 5.3).
5.1 EUT and CPT Estimates
Table 2 reports the relative risk estimates assuming that choices are entirely explained by EUT
(from eqn.[8]), and making such risk estimate be a linear function of selected individual charac-
teristics. Three main results can be drawn from the Table. First, we nd a moderate degree of
risk aversion (average breut = 0:45). Second, there is evidence of a large degree of randomness in
choices, as indicated by the big standard deviation of the random mistakes, b = 2:79, a value that
is 5 percent lower than the expected utility obtained by subjects who chose lottery Luna (average
across all decision rows), and 12 percent lower than the expected utility obtained by those choosing
lottery Sol (average across all rows). Third, subjects with higher education are less risk averse, as
shown by the decreasingly negative coecients of the variables some secondary and skilled, though
only in the latter case the eect is statistically signicant (p-value < 0:01). The indicators of age
and gender do not appear to predict risk preferences. While the variables included in the regression
are jointly signicant (p-value < 0:001), the fact that only one variable included results signicantly
correlated with risk preferences might suggest that our estimates would seem unreliable.
Table 2: Expected Utility Estimates with Fechner Normal Errors
Heterogeneous Agent Case
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
reuti Intercept 0.44 0.16 0.00 0.13 0.75
Female 0.02 0.12 0.87 -0.22 0.26
Young (Age < 40) -0.18 0.18 0.31 -0.53 0.17
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.05 0.16 0.77 -0.26 0.36
Old (Age > 60) 0.11 0.19 0.56 -0.26 0.48
Illiterate -0.33 0.28 0.24 -0.87 0.21
Some secondary -0.23 0.15 0.13 -0.54 0.07
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.53 0.20 0.00 -0.92 -0.14
Low Pisco 0.19 0.13 0.14 -0.06 0.44
High Pisco 0.45 0.42 0.28 -0.38 1.28
Predicted reut at average values 0.45
u Intercept 2.79 0.25 0.00 2.31 3.27
N 3,650
Notes: S.E. clustered at the individual level. The omitted category for age is for those aged
between 40-50. The omitted category for education is for those with some primary education.
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We also estimated risk preferences using only subject-specic dummy variables in a separate
regression (unreported in this paper), where we conrm the nding of risk averse preferences, with
an average risk estimate of 1.56. These risk estimates have expectedly more variability (the standard
deviation is 4.12) than the estimates reported above, and show a low correlation (of around 0.16)
with those. Moreover, those risk estimates are less correlated with education and age than the
estimates reported in Table 2 (-0.11 versus -0.65 and 0.08 versus 0.63).
Turning to the maximum likelihood estimates under CPT from eqn.[14]), we observe a relatively
high average risk estimate (brpt = 0:74, as seen in Table 3).38 Second, we nd a signicant subjective
probability weighting, given that the parameter estimate, b = 0:54 < 1 is signicantly dierent
from 0 or 1 (p-values in both cases < 0.001). This estimate of  is pictured by the dot-dashed
curve in Figure 2 above, where we see that subjects overweight probabilities (i.e., w(p) > p) until
p = 0:3, and thereafter they underweight (i.e., w(p) < p) middle and large probabilities. Third, the
mistakes in choices made, assumed to be mean-zero normal random variables, have a large standard
deviation, b = 1:38, which represents 29 percent of the expected utility obtained by subjects who
chose lottery Luna (average across all decision rows), and 27.6 percent of the expected utility
obtained by those choosing lottery Sol (average across all rows).
Fourth, we continue to nd that subjects with higher education are less risk averse, a nding that
can have important implications in terms of subjects' willingness to undertake risky but potentially
protable investments. In particular, we could expect those persons to be more able to asses risk
and have a better understanding of the salient features of any new technology. Furthermore, we nd
that our risk estimates under EUT and CPT are signicantly correlated with nancial literacy39
(the coecients of correlation are -0.26 and -0.35, respectively): more nancially literate subjects,
who also happen to be better educated, are less risk averse. Other individual characteristics, such
as age and gender, do not enter with statistically signicant coecients, though women (variable
female) appear to be slightly more risk averse than men and older persons seem more risk averse
than younger ones.
In order to have an idea about the magnitude of the eect of higher education on the CRRA
coecient estimates, in an auxiliary regression, not included in this paper, we estimated the risk and
weighting function parameters using as covariates female, age (in years), and education (in years),
and found that having 10 more years of education would decrease the risk estimate by between 0.3
(under EUT) and 0.5 (under CPT); the associated coecients resulted barely signicant in both
cases (p-values are 0.081 and 0.001). The eect of age on risk aversion thus estimated is negligible,
while being female implies a higher risk aversion by 0.07 (EUT) or 0.22 (CPT), with only the latter
being barely statistically signicant (p-value is 0.105). Overall, all the variables included in the
regressions are jointly statistically signicant under both models.
38The correlation coecient between the risk estimates under EUT and CPT (heterogeneous cases) is 0.82.
39This indicator measures the level of comprehension of the rules of the insurance game played by our subjects. It
includes a variable of self-reported comprehension of the experiment, and objective measures of how well they knew
the consequences of loan default, and the features of the indemnity function.
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Table 3: Cumulative Prospect Theory Estimates with Fechner Normal Errors
Heterogeneous Agent Case
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
rcpti Intercept 0.85 0.18 0.00 0.50 1.19
Female 0.15 0.15 0.31 -0.14 0.43
Young (Age < 40) -0.07 0.12 0.58 -0.30 0.17
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.15 0.13 0.27 -0.11 0.41
Old (Age > 60) 0.11 0.22 0.63 -0.33 0.54
Illiterate -0.28 0.42 0.50 -1.10 0.54
Some secondary educ. -0.49 0.16 0.00 -0.80 -0.19
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.71 0.19 0.00 -1.08 -0.34
Low Pisco 0.07 0.13 0.57 -0.17 0.32
High Pisco 0.03 0.22 0.88 -0.40 0.47
Predicted rcpt at average values 0.74
i Intercept 0.44 0.08 0.00 0.29 0.60
Female -0.09 0.06 0.17 -0.21 0.04
Young (Age < 40) 0.09 0.17 0.59 -0.24 0.43
Middle (Age: [50-60]) -0.09 0.07 0.15 -0.22 0.03
Old (Age > 60) -0.07 0.09 0.47 -0.25 0.12
Illiterate 0.03 0.13 0.82 -0.22 0.28
Some secondary educ. 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.38
Skilled (> sec. educ.) 0.53 0.29 0.06 -0.03 1.09
Low Pisco 0.04 0.07 0.50 -0.08 0.17
High Pisco 0.16 0.15 0.29 -0.14 0.46
Predicted  at average values 0.54
 Intercept 1.38 0.18 0.00 1.02 1.73
N 3,650
Notes: S.E. clustered at the individual level. The omitted category for age is for those aged
between 40-50. The omitted category for education is for those with some primary education.
Before turning to examine the individual characteristics correlated with the weighting function
parameter estimate (b), we should note that, as long as b < 1, greater values of b imply a lower
sensitivity to probability changes, which is reected by a atter curve (with respect to the 45
degree line) both in the overweighting and underweighting regions of such function, and also that
the intersection with the 45 degree line happens at larger values of probabilities. From Table 3,
we see that only education is signicantly correlated with the shape of the weighting function.40
Further, we see that women display a more curved weighting function, which implies that they
underweight medium and large probabilities more strongly than males, but the coecient on the
40Using the results of our auxiliary regression, we nd that 5 additional years of education would imply an increase
in b by 0.24 (e.g., from 0.54 to 0.78 using the average values of the other covariates); which will cause a substantial
reduction in the curvature of the weighting function, especially in the convex, underweighting region.
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gender indicator is not statistically signicant (p-value = 0.17).41 While examining this gender
dierence goes beyond the scope of our analysis, recent evidence suggests that women's probability
weighting is sensitive to mood states, while men's is not (Fehr-Duda et al., 2006b).42
So far, we have been estimating the random calculation errors as being homoskedastic, with
a constant standard deviation of the errors across subjects. However, it seems plausible to hy-
pothesize that the magnitude of such standard deviation may be correlated with some observable
characteristics. In particular, we will test the signicance of age and education (both expressed in
years)43 in the following errors equation:
bi = b0 + baAgei + beEducationi: (18)
In the case of EUT, the average standard deviation of the mistake thus estimated is large, 3.30,
while the resulting risk aversion evaluated at the mean of the regressors is 0.57 (see Table 4).
Table 4: EUT Estimates Assuming Heterogeneous Subjects
With Heteroskedastic Fechner Normal Errors
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
reuti Intercept 0.45 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.83
Female 0.10 0.10 0.34 -0.10 0.30
Young (Age < 40) -0.0003 0.12 1.00 -0.24 0.24
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.04 0.14 0.76 -0.24 0.33
Old (Age > 60) 0.23 0.27 0.40 -0.30 0.75
Illiterate -0.61 0.41 0.14 -1.42 0.20
Some secondary educ. -0.22 0.19 0.24 -0.60 0.15
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.35 0.20 0.08 -0.75 0.05
Low Pisco 0.15 0.11 0.16 -0.06 0.36
High Pisco 0.77 0.42 0.07 -0.06 1.60
Predicted reut at average values 0.57
ui Intercept 2.30 0.68 0.00 0.95 3.64
Age (years) 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06
Education (years) -0.20 0.05 0.00 -0.29 -0.11
Predicted  at average values 3.30
N 3,650
Notes: S.E. clustered at the individual level. The omitted category for age is for those aged
between 40-50. The omitted category for education is for those with some primary education.
Given the nature of our risk game, we would expect farmers with less education to display
greater calculation mistakes in their choices than those with higher education. Indeed, we nd that
41The eect of gender on the shape of weighting function was also addressed by Fehr-Duda et al. (2006a), who
nd a similar result to ours.
42The authors nd that women in a good mood tend to underestimate probabilities of gains more heavily than do
women in a bad mood. A better mood than usual is also correlated with weighting probabilities more \optimistically".
43Expressing age and education as indicator variables in the model did not yield convergence.
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mistakes are positively correlated with age (ba = 0:04) and negatively correlated with education
(be =  0:20), with their respective coecients being statistically signicant at one percent. The
regressors on the risk parameter equation are also jointly signicant at 5 percent.
For the CPT case, the average risk aversion estimate is 0.67, the average weighting function
parameter is 0.86, and the average standard deviation of the noise, 2.11 (Table 5). In the errors
equation, education enters with an insignicant coecient, but the coecient on age, be = 0:03, is
signicant at 1 percent, and indicates that older subjects are more prone to make mistakes.
Table 5: CPT Estimates Assuming Heterogeneous Subjects
With Heteroskedastic Fechner Normal Errors
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
rcpti Intercept 0.68 0.22 0.00 0.26 1.10
Female 0.16 0.13 0.23 -0.10 0.42
Young (Age < 40) 0.10 0.12 0.43 -0.15 0.34
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.09 0.13 0.51 -0.17 0.35
Old (Age > 60) 0.08 0.23 0.74 -0.38 0.53
Illiterate -0.03 0.54 0.95 -1.09 1.03
Some secondary -0.35 0.19 0.06 -0.72 0.02
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.54 0.23 0.02 -1.00 -0.08
Low Pisco 0.05 0.10 0.62 -0.15 0.26
High Pisco 0.30 0.30 0.32 -0.29 0.89
Predicted rcpt at average values 0.67
i Intercept 0.55 0.17 0.00 0.23 0.88
Female -0.15 0.13 0.25 -0.40 0.10
Young (Age < 40) -0.15 0.12 0.19 -0.39 0.08
Middle (Age: [50-60]) -0.11 0.12 0.38 -0.34 0.13
Old (Age > 60) -0.01 0.17 0.97 -0.33 0.32
Illiterate 3.58 3.56 0.31 -3.39 10.55
Some secondary 0.19 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.42
Skilled (> sec. educ.) 0.39 0.30 0.19 -0.19 0.98
Low Pisco 0.11 0.13 0.38 -0.14 0.36
High Pisco 0.47 0.19 0.01 0.10 0.84
Predicted  at average values 0.86
i Intercept 0.73 0.76 0.34 -0.75 2.22
Age (years) 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06
Education (years) -0.08 0.06 0.16 -0.20 0.03
Predicted  at average values 2.11
N 3,640
Notes: S.E. clustered at the individual level. The omitted category for age is for those aged 40-50.
The omitted category for education is for those with some primary education.
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5.2 Mixing EUT and CPT: Estimation Results
In this section, we will relax the assumption made so far that the data are entirely explained by a
single decision model. Instead, we will now allow the data to be explained by two decision models,
EUT and CPT, in order to account for heterogeneity in preferences (we will estimate the model
given by eqn.[17]). In this two-component mixture model specication, in addition to the risk and
weighting parameters under each model, the proportion of the sample that behaves according to
either EUT or CPT is estimated. Maximum likelihood estimates of those parameters, as well as
the standard deviation of the Fechner errors, are reported in Table 6.
We can see that 76 percent of subjects behave as prospect utility maximizers (i.e., bpt = 0:76),
overweighting small probabilities and underweighting medium and large probabilities, while the
remaining 24 percent behave as expected utility maximizers, treating probabilities linearly. These
mixing proportions are statistically dierent from 0.5 or 0 (both p-values < 0.05). Moreover, we
continue to nd evidence of risk aversion: the risk estimate for the EUT-type subjects is 0.20, while
that for the CPT-type subjects is 1.21. Furthermore, the estimated weighting parameter, b = 0:33,
implies a substantial curvature in the weighting function, especially in the convex region (see the
solid inverse-S shaped curve depicted in Figure 2 above). Lastly, we report that the estimated
standard deviations of the Fechner errors are still large, in particular the one related with the CPT
model, bpt = 1:4. We further observe that several
Table 6: Mixture Model Estimates with Homogeneous Mixing Proportions
Assuming Homogeneous Subjects and Normal Fechner Errors
Variable Expected Utility Prospect Theory
r Coecient 0.20*** 1.21*
Standard Error 0.07 0.65
95% C. Interval [0.07, 0.34] [-0.08, 2.49]
 Coecient n.a. 0.33*
Standard Error 0.19
95% C. Interval [-0.04, 0.71]
 Coecient 0.24** 0.76***
Standard Error 0.10 0.10
95% C. Interval [0.06, 0.43] [0.57, 0.94]
 Coecient 0.51* 1.40
Standard Error 0.26 0.88
95% C. Interval [-0.01, 1.03] [-0.33, 3.13]
N 3,780 3,780
n.a.: not applicable.
*** (**) [*] denotes signicance at 1% (5%) [10%] level. S.E. clustered at the individual level.
In sum, from this mixture model we nd that the EU maximizers are signicantly less risk
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averse than the PU maximizers, and this model allows us to capture the existence of nonlinear
probability weighting in the choices made. A clear implication of the statistical signicance of
the mixing proportions is that aggregation of preferences, namely assuming that only one model
governs risk preferences, becomes problematic.
While it could be interesting to estimate the heterogeneous agent case (i.e., to include covariates
as linear functions of the risk and weighting function parameters) under this mixture model, which
it would provide a clearer picture of the heterogeneity within each type of decision maker, doing
so did not yield convergence. Fortunately, we still can examine the distinctive characteristics that
dene the regime (EUT-type or CPT-type) subjects belong. We proceed in this direction in the
next subsection.
5.2.1 Heterogeneous Mixing Weights: Explaining the Regime Switching Behavior
In order to test for the existence of heterogeneity within the subset of EUT-type or CPT-type
subjects, in terms of the characteristics associated with their belonging to one regime or another,
we next estimate the mixing proportion parameter as a linear function of gender (female) and
farming experience expressed in years:44
beuti = b0 + bfeFemalei + bfaFarm expi (19)
in the likelihood function shown in eqn.[17]. Recall that b0 is the parameter we have been estimating
thus far. The maximum likelihood estimates shown in Table 7 indicate that gender and farming
experience are statistically signicant (they are further jointly but barely signicantly: p-value =
0.107). While these results should be taken with caution, since the regression does not capture the
heterogeneity at the parameter level (i.e., no covariates are included for the risk parameters),45 they
suggest that subjects with more farming experience behave according to expected utility theory,
while less experienced farmers's behavior is explained by prospect theory, a result also found by
List (2004) for a dierent set of subjects. Interestingly, these EUT-type of subjects also attained
higher education levels than the CPT-type of subjects (12 versus 5 years), and are substantially
younger (40 versus 58 years old). In both cases, the means T -tests reject the null hypothesis that
the means are equal at 1 percent of signicance. Evaluated at the average values of those covariates,
the estimated value of beut is 0:18, thus implying that most of the observations (82 percent) are
explained by CPT (bcpt is 0:82).
5.3 Switching Behavior and Probability Weighting with Large Mistakes
As mentioned in the introduction, we observe a large proportion (to be precise, 196 or 52 percent)
of subjects switching back and forth from one lottery to the other in our risk game.46 The current
44Including education in the equation results in globally insignicant regression coecients.
45The regression including covariates in the risk and weighting function parameters did not converge.
46121 subjects switched only once.
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Table 7: Mixture Model Estimates with Heterogeneous Mixing Proportions
Assuming Homogeneous Agents & Normal Fechner Errors
Variable Estimate S.E. 95% Conf. Interval
reut Intercept 0.20** 0.10 0.01 0.40
rcpt Intercept 0.71*** 0.25 0.21 1.21
 Intercept 0.54*** 0.17 0.21 0.88
euti Intercept 0.72*** 0.14 0.46 0.99
Female 0.24* 0.15 -0.04 0.53
Farming Experience-Yrs. 0.47*** 0.01 0.44 0.50
eut Intercept 0.62** 0.25 0.13 1.13
cpt Intercept 2.19*** 0.64 0.94 3.43
N 3,680
*** (**) [*] denotes signicance at 1% (5%) [10%] level.
S.E. clustered at the individual level.
literature falls short to explain this multiple switching behavior (MSB) and, to the best of our
knowledge, only provides two potential explanations: lack of salience in the monetary incentives
(Bruner, 2008), and a revealed preference for indierence between the two lotteries (Harrison and
Rutstrom, 2008).
In this section, we examine an alternative explanation to MSB: a combination of large random
calculation errors made by our subjects and the existence of subjective distortions of underlying
probabilities found in our sample. To analyze this matter, we will consider the risk estimate of
an average subject in the heterogeneous agent case under CPT (i.e., we will use br = 0:74) (see
Table 3). We will then picture the decision rules functions in the absence of random mistakes
under EUT and CPT (heterogeneous agent case). These decision rules are given by the dierence
in expected utilities (or prospective utilities, depending on the model considered) between lottery
Sol (S) and lottery Luna (L), and are a function of the estimated risk parameter, br , conditional
on the probabilities or decision weights used:47
EUm(brj p) = EUSm(br)  EULm(br) (20)
PUm(br; bjddw[p]) = PUSm(br)  PULm(br): (21)
Pictured in Figure 3, we see that those functions are monotonically decreasing over the decision
rows, m, displayed in the horizontal axis. A positive value of EUm() or PUm() would obviously
mean that lottery S should be selected; while a negative value would imply that lottery L should be
chosen. The solid line depicts the true expected gains from choosing lottery S over lottery L under
EUT, while the dashed line pictures the same function for CPT. In both cases, those functions
attain a positive value until decision row 7, and thereafter their values become negative, meaning
47Note that these equations are similar to the ones used above (eqns.[15] and [3], respectively), but without the
noise parameter, and with the value of the risk estimate under each model is already plugged in the equations.
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that lottery L should be chosen, in the absence of calculation mistakes. We can see that for a
given risk parameter (equal to 0.74), while linear probability weighting results in a straight line
with negative slope (the solid line, EUT), non-linear probability weighting implied by the weighting
function parameter b of 0:54 (the dotted curve, CPT) attens the expected gains function for the
rst nine decision rows.
Figure 3: Expected Gains under EUT and CPT















































How can we then rationalize MSB in this context? Figure 3 can be misleading in answering such
a question, given that it shows expected gains under dierent utility functions, which are ordinal
measures and have dierent underlying distributions of calculation mistakes. Thus, one way to
examine MSB is to estimate the probability of making mistakes under the error distributions
estimated above (b j EUT  N [0; 2:79] and b j CPT  N [0; 1:38]). Thus, the probability of not
making mistakes (i.e., of choosing lottery S when it has higher expected gains; and selecting lottery
L, otherwise) under EUT is given by eqn.[5]:





where  denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. A similar expression holds for CPT.
The probability of making mistakes (Pr[mistakes]) is then [1  Pr(no mistakes)]. We then plugged
the estimated values of the true expected gains from choosing lottery S into the prior expression
and computed such probabilities for each decision row m. We report these calculations in Table
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8, which also presents the decision weights (dw[p]), expressed by eqn.[12], used to produce Figure
3. Dened over the cumulative probability distribution, these decision weights are implied by the
weighting functions reported in eqn.[13] for the above-indicated value of br = 0:74. We see in the
table that in the CPT heterogeneous case, subjects overweight (i.e., dw[p] > p) small and medium
probabilities (up to row 6), and thereafter they underweight (large) probabilities, a result that is
reected by the shape of the expected gains function for CPT pictured above.
So, can the nonlinear probability weighting observed under CPT help explain the MSB? The
results are not as strong as we expected. To address the question posed, note that as long as the
probability of making mistakes is greater under CPT than EUT, the former model would explain
better the MSB. And, the larger the gap between the probabilities of making mistakes, the greater
the \explanatory eect" of the model showing the higher probability. Thus, as seen in the table,
CPT explains slightly better than EUT the MSB in rows 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9. In turn, EUT does
better in rows 1, 7, and 10. (In rows 2 and 6, both models explain MSB equally well.) Further
note that the probability of making mistakes under both models gets large from decision rows 5
through 9 (40 to almost 50 percent), a result that reects the large magnitude of the calculation
errors made by our subjects. A more accurate estimation of subject-specic calculation mistakes,
which cannot be done in this paper because of our limited sample size, would likely help to better
examine the MSB.
Table 8: Expected Gains from Lottery Sol and Decision Weigths under EUT and CPT
Variables Decision Row
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
EUT Heterogeneous agent case, with b = 2.79a
Probability, pb 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Expected gain from choosing
lottery S over L 2.10 1.76 1.42 1.08 0.74 0.40 0.06 -0.28 -0.62 -0.97
Probability of mistakec 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.41 0.36
CPT Heterogeneous agent case, with b = 0:54 & b = 1.38d
Decision weight, dw(p)b 0.36 0.46 0.53 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.74 0.80 1.00
Expected gain from choosing
lottery S over L 1.22 0.88 0.64 0.47 0.33 0.19 0.06 -0.08 -0.28 -0.97
Probability of mistakec 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.24
a Estimates from Table 2. b These are the probabilities, weights, and decision weights, of the higher prize
under each lottery. E.g., p1(higher prize)=0.1, p2(lower prize)=0.9, w(p2)=0.64, dw(p1)=1{w(p2)=0.36.
c This is the probability of choosing the lottery with lower expected gains.
d Estimates from Table 3.
In terms of the experimental design, the multiple switching behavior could be reduced in two
31
ways: by doing a better job explaining the mechanics of the game.48 Some authors suggest that
MSB can be due to indierence (Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008); if this is the case, introducing a
\I am indierent between lotteries" choice could help mitigate the problem. However, when such
behavior is more a result of confusion, such modication would likely be insucient. A second
way to address the problem could be by providing bigger (probably monetary) incentives to pay
attention. This solution goes in line with what Bruner (2007) proposed. In terms of what we nd
in this section, any factor that may improve the subjects' understanding of the mechanics of the
game would likely reduce the prevalence of the MSB.
6 Estimation Results Excluding Irrational Subjects
As mentioned in the introduction, a large number of subjects (105 to be precise) mistakenly chose
the lottery Sol in the 10th decision row, thus preferring to get 1,800 Soles for sure, instead of
the 3,500 Soles for sure they could have gotten by choosing lottery Luna. We call these subjects,
irrational. As one may expect, those subjects attained lower levels of schooling (two years less of
education), a much lower nancial literacy indicator (0.48 versus 0.56), and are signicantly older (in
more than 4 years),49 than subjects who did not make such mistake. Dropping those 105 individuals
from our original sample of 378 subjects (3,780 observations), results in a restricted sample of 273
subjects (2,730 observations). From that subsample, we have individual-level information for 265
individuals (2,650 observations).
Summarizing the regression results, reported in Appendix E, we nd that the expected utility
maximizers in this subsample are much less risk averse than in our full sample: breu = 0:11 (see
column 3 of Table E.1), and although the estimated magnitude of the errors in the choices made is
still substantial, it is expectedly lower than in the full sample, b = 2:0 versus b = 2:8. Further,
unlike the full sample, age indicators become signicant: young (subjects who are 40 years old
or less) and middle (subjects who are between 50-60 years old) are less risk averse with respect
to subjects aged between 40-50 (the excluded age category), while illiterate subjects are less risk
averse than those who have some primary education (the excluded education category).
On the other hand, under CPT, we continue to see strong evidence of subjective probability
weighting, b = 0:46 (see column 3 of Table E.2), and we further nd that more educated subjects
are signicantly more likely to be less risk averse than those with only primary education, a result
also found in the full sample. Two predictors of the shape of the weighting function are higher
education and younger age: more educated and younger persons are less sensitive to probability
changes. Lastly, the standard deviation of the mistakes is relatively small in the restricted sample;
this result is because a large proportion of the noise has been removed with the irrational subjects.
Further exploring the data, we estimated a mixture model for the restricted sample. The results,
48Also, playing a practice round for real money would likely help reduce the magnitude of the random component
in choices.
49All the mean T -tests performed in those cases have a p-value < 0.001.
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reported in Table E.3, show evidence of the higher proportion of observations best tted by CPT
than EUT (bpt = 0:71), and of moderate (EUT-type, breu = 0:42) to high (CPT-type, brpt = 1:14)
risk aversion levels. We should mention, however, that the weighting function parameter thus
estimated, b = 0:27, implies a non-monotonic curve, very close to a step function.
To sum up then, even for the restricted sample, we nd that a large proportion of subjects
makes risky choices using nonlinear probability weighting, a result recurrently found by the recent
literature.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the results of an artefactual eld experiment designed to measure risk
preferences in a southern Peruvian valley. We t the experimental data to two of the leading models
of decision under risk, Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT),
and in both cases nd evidence of risk averse preferences. This qualitative result remains unaltered
when a subset (a proportion that is also estimated) of observations is allowed to be explained by
dierent decision-making processes or models (i.e., either EUT or CPT), although the degree of
risk aversion thus estimated varies substantially.
In terms of the individual characteristics that predict risk preferences, in general, only higher
education appears to be positively correlated with a greater propensity to take risks, a result
that not only suggests a linkage between cognitive abilities and risk preferences, but can also
have interesting implications for the diusion of new technologies involving risks. We could, for
instance, hypothesize that if the elicited preferences indeed reect preferences held in real life, the
\Schumpeterean" farmers (innovators) would likely come from the higher end of the education
sample distribution. This conjecture implicitly assumes that preferences are somewhat stable, a
result that needs to be properly tested. Examining preferences stability would certainly require a
more complicated experimental design than ours. The result that only higher education appears
signicant in the regressions may suggest that our estimates would seem to be unreliable, which
advises us to take these results with caution.
On the other hand, when we assume that only one model explains the entire data, the risk
estimates are higher under CPT than EUT, and nonlinear probability weighting often plays a
role in explaining risky choices. If we instead let the observations be endogenously classied as
EUT-type or CPT-type by estimating mixture models, we nd that CPT explains typically about
70 percent or a higher proportion of the observations; the remaining percent of observations is
explained by EUT, where subjects do not distort objective probabilities. This result shows that
considering a single decision model as representative of the preferences of an entire set of people
could lead to biased results. Statistical power issues prevent us from conducting further analysis
with this mixture model specication, in particular that related to the heterogeneity within each
type of subjects (EUT-type and CPT-type).
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In addition to the evidence of preference heterogeneity at the functional form level, we oer
some partial evidence that underweighting of small and medium probabilities and overweighting
of large probabilities, in the presence of large random calculation errors, may explain better than
EUT the multiple switching across decision rows observed in our data; however. However, nonlinear
probability weighting under CPT does not explain multiple switching as much as we expected.
While in principle, those errors are capturing the eects of several factors, including confusion
and indierence between lotteries, we nd that they are correlated with education and age: less
educated and older subjects are more likely to display larger noises in their choices.
This research has several limitations, which suggest directions for future research. First, includ-
ing a loss dimension in the lotteries would have allowed us to test loss aversion in preferences, a
subject that may be important if we would like to examine the predictive power of our estimates
in terms of decisions involving potential losses. Ignoring loss preferences may thus be biasing our
results. Second, we require an ad hoc experimental design in order to account for other variables
that may aect risk preferences. For instance,some recent works suggest that psychological factors,
such as emotions (e.g., mood, anger, fear), can also be correlated with risk preferences. Third,
a more sophisticated modeling of the random choices could allow us to tease out its nonrandom
component. Fourth, in a world where rationally bounded people are exposed to an experimental
environment where decisions need to be taken in a short time, the assumption that subjects can
make complex calculations with little diculty is clearly unrealistic. In that context, it could be
interesting to unveil some heuristics (if any) used by subjects to make risky choices. As we move
towards the use of more comprehensive approaches to explain people's behavior, this promises to
be an active area of research. Finally, in principle, our results may be sensitive to the errors type
assumed (Fechner's) or the specication of the weighting function; therefore exploring alternative
error stories and weighting functions may prove to be helpful to examine the robustness of our
ndings. In an eort to advance in this direction, Appendix F provides details about some of those
proposed extensions to our analysis. As in that Appendix, the main qualitative results continue to
hold under an alternative error type and weighting function.
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Appendix A. Our Research Area
Figure A.1: Maps of Peru (Right) and Pisco Valley (Left)
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Appendix B. Experimental Subjects: Basic Statistics
Table B.1 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Dependent variable
Insured loan take-up rate (high stakes) 0.57 0.49 378
Demographics and Education
Age (years) 54.9 13.3 367
Aged less than 40 0.14 0.35 367
Aged between than 40 and 50 0.19 0.39 367
Aged between than 50 and 60 0.33 0.47 367
Aged over 60 0.33 0.47 367
Female (Yes=1) 0.27 0.44 367
Education (years) 6.33 4.11 365
Illiterate 0.05 0.23 365
Some year of primary school 0.51 0.50 365
Some year of secondary school 0.34 0.47 365
Completed more than secondary school 0.09 0.29 365
Financial literacy indicator1 0.54 0.20 378
Agriculture and Assets
Farming experience (years) 23.9 12.7 368
Size of owned agricultural plot (hectares) 6.03 5.57 367
Size of cultivated land (hectares)2 5.01 4.13 365
Planted cotton (Yes=1)2 0.83 0.39 368
Cotton yields (quintals per hectare)2 46.8 14.8 293
Self-reported value of owned ag plot (000 Soles)3 7.43 8.78 307
Self-reported value of house (000 Soles)4 15.92 21.0 321
Self-reported value of assets (000 Soles)5 20.42 21.8 362
Networks
Talked to somebody in her \valley" about farming(Yes=1) 0.67 0.47 378
Number of \valley" members in her agricultural network 1.73 1.61 378
Has ever been a local authority (Yes=1) 0.39 0.49 365
Belongs to a farmer association (Yes=1) 0.29 0.46 364
Credit and Insurance
Got credit for farming activities (Yes=1)2 0.61 0.49 378
Got formal credit (Yes=1) 0.39 0.49 232
Got credit from cotton mills (Yes=1) 0.27 0.45 232
Has any other type of insurance (Yes=1) 0.44 0.50 378
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Table B.1 Summary Statistics (continued)
Variable Mean Std.Dev. N
Experimental Variables
Risk rationed (Baseline Game) (Yes=1) 0.24 0.43 378
Risk parameter estimate, EUT6 0.45 0.29 365
Risk parameter estimate, CPT6 0.74 0.32 365
Probability weighting parameter estimate, CPT6 0.54 0.21 365
Overweighting (Yes=1)7 0.20 0.40 365
Faced a bad year, low stakes Insurance Game(Yes=1)8 0.29 0.45 378
Drew a black chip in last low-stake round, Insurance Game 0.08 0.28 378
Winnings from all the farming games (Soles) 16.8 2.6 378
Winnings from low stakes rounds, Insurance Game (Soles) 3.04 0.85 378
1 Indicator calculated using knowledge of insurance and loan project, as well as a self-reported degree of .
comprehension. 2 It refers to the 2007-2008 farming season. 3 The question was \how much do you think
you'd have to pay to rent a hectare of land with similar characteristics to your main parcel. 4 The question
was \how much do you think you'd have to pay to buy a house with similar characteristics to your own".
5 Wealth includes the values of land and house. 6 EUT (CPT): Risk estimate assuming Expected Utility
Theory (Cumulative Prospect Theory). 7 Overweighting means that the weighting parameter is greater
than 0.7. 8 It means that subject chose the uninsured loan project the season a black chip was drawn
in her valley (hence loan default).
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Appendix C. Experiment Instructions for the Risk Game
What follows are the instructions given to subjects. Recall that the monitor used slides that were
projected on a wall. The parts in [square brackets] are directions the monitor should follow, and
the parts in fcurly bracketsg are notes to clarify information provided to subjects or procedures
followed.
The objective of this activity is to win money. There are 4 possible prizes: 90, 1400, 3500, and
1800 soles. How are you going to win these prizes?
[Show slide 1: Lottery prizes]
To win these prizes, rst you will have to choose between two options, the option Sol and the
option Luna. If you choose the option Sol, you can win a maximum prize of 1,800 soles and a
minimum prize of 1,400 soles. And if you choose the option Luna, you can win a maximum prize of
3,500 soles and a minimum prize of 90 soles. Note that with the option Sol the dierence between
the maximum and minimum prize is small, while it is large in the case of the option Luna.
In addition, in the option Sol the maximum prize of 1,800 soles is smaller than the maximum
prize of 3,500 soles in the option Luna, and the minimum prize of 1,400 soles in the option Sol is
greater than the minimum prize of 90 soles in the option Luna.
Thus, you will pick between Sol and Luna in 10 rows, one after another. Once you have picked
between Sol and Luna, the prize you will receive in each row will depend on the number that you
obtain by rolling a 10-sided die like the one your assistants are now showing you. This die has 10
sides numbered from 1 to 10; that is, it is equally likely to get any of the 10 numbers.
We will now see an example of the prizes you may earn. Please look at the second row on page
7 in your binders fpage 7 displayed the 10 decision rowsg.
[Show slide 2: Lottery prizes in row 2]
[Pick a volunteer] Let's see. . . [Say name], in the second row, which do you prefer: Sol or Luna?
fs/he will say Sol/Lunag. Now throw the die. The die is showing the number [1,2,3,...,or 10].
Since [say name] chose [Sol/Luna], we see that in the second row the prize that corresponds to the
number [1,2,3,...,10] is [say amount]. Now, if [say name] would have chosen [Luna/Sol], the prize
that corresponds to [1,2,3,...,10] is [say amount].
Let's do another example.
[Show slide 3: Lottery prizes in row 8]
[Pick another volunteer]. Let's see. . . [say name], in the eighth row, which do you prefer: Sol or
Luna? [s/he will say Sol/Luna]. Now throw the die. The die is showing the number [1,2,3,...,10].
Since [say name] chose [Sol/Luna], we see that in the eighth row the prize that corresponds to the
number [1,2,3,...,10] is [say amount]. Now, if [say name] would have chosen [Luna/Sol], the prize
that corresponds to [1,2,3,...,10] is [say amount].
Now we will compare the prizes that could be obtained from the two rows we have used in our
examples.
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[Show slide 4: Lottery prizes in rows 2 and 8]
If throwing the die results in the number 4, those who chose Sol in row 2 would win 1,400 soles
and those that chose Luna in row 2 would win 90 soles. In row 8, if throwing the die results in
number 4, those who chose Sol would win 1,800 soles and those who chose Luna would win 3,500
soles.
Note that in row 8 there are more chances of winning the maximum prize than there are in row
2, in both Sol and Luna. This is because in row 8 there are 8 chances to win the maximum prize
and only 2 chances to win the minimum prize, while in row 2, there are only 2 chances to win the
maximum prize and 8 chances to win the minimum prize.
Now look at page 7 [Show slide 5: Lottery prizes in the 10 rows]. . . in which you can see that
as one goes down the table, the chances to win the larger prize are greater; and the chances of
winning the smaller prize are fewer.
Notice that in the last row, row 10, regardless of which number appears on the die, the prize
you will receive will be 1,800 soles if you choose Sol and 3,500 soles if you choose Luna.
Practice Round
We are now going to do a practice round. Please look at your worksheets on page 7 of your
binders. In this sheet you have to choose, for each of the 10 rows, between the option Sol and the
option Luna, marking with an \X" on the drawing of the sun or the moon.
Please mark on your practice sheet for each of the 10 rows the option that you prefer in each
row.
After that, we will choose one row to determine the prize you would win. Assistants, please
begin the practice round in your valleys.
fAssistants advised the monitor when all choices in their valleys were made.g
Now, we will see what you would have won. To determine the row you will play, we will throw
the 10-sided die in each valley. Assistants, throw the die one time in each of your valleys...
fAssistants advised the monitor when dice were rolled one time in their valleys.g
Now that we know which row was chosen in each valley, each of you will throw the 10-sided die
to determine your prize. Assistants, have each farmer in your valley throw the die.
fAssistants advised the monitor when all choices in their valleys were made.g
fThe monitor then chose two valleys to illustrate the procedure to determine winnings for this
game.g
Let's see. . . [say name in valley 1], we are going to see what would have been your prize. First,
which row was selected in your valley?... And in that row, did you pick Sol or Luna? ... And what
number did you get when you threw the die?.....Then [say name] in row [say resulting row], with
the option [Sol/Luna] and the number [say number of die roll], would win [say amount]. If [say
name] would have chosen the other option [Luna/Sol], he would win [say amount].
Let's see. . . [say name in valley 2], we are going to see what would have been your prize. First,
which row was selected in your valley?... And in that row, did you pick Sol or Luna?... And what
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number did you get when you threw the die?.....Then [say name] in row [say resulting row], with
the option [Sol/Luna] and the number [say number of die roll], would win [say amount]. If [say
name] would have chosen the other option [Luna/Sol], he would win [say amount].
This was a practice round. Now we are going to do it for real money.
High Payout Round
How will we determine how much money you will win for participating in this activity? This
will depend on the prizes obtained in the row that is chosen at random, in the same way that your
earnings were selected in the earlier activities. To choose the row, you will throw a 10-sided die
one time for each valley, just as you did in the practice round. We will pay you one sol in cash
for each 600 soles of prize winnings. That is, the minimum amount that you could win is 90/600=
0.15 soles, and the maximum amount is 3,500/600= almost 6 soles.
Please look at your sheet for this activity, on page 8 of your binders.
[show slide 6: lottery prizes in the 10 rows]
In this activity you have to choose, just like in the practice round, between the options Sol and
Luna, marking with an \X" on the drawing of the sun or the moon in each row, from 1 to 10.
Before we start, are there any questions?
fPause for questions.g
Now, please, mark on your sheets for this activity in each one of the 10 rows the option that
you prefer.
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Appendix D. Risk Game Worksheet Sample
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Appendix E. Regression Results for the Restricted Sample
Table E.1: EUT Estimates with Heterogeneous Subjects and Normal Fechner Errors
(Restricted Sample: N = 2,650 )
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
reuti Intercept 0.18 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.35
Female 0.04 0.07 0.58 -0.10 0.18
Young (Age < 40) -0.18 0.10 0.06 -0.38 0.01
Middle (Age: [50-60]) -0.15 0.09 0.09 -0.32 0.03
Old (Age > 60) -0.02 0.09 0.80 -0.20 0.16
Illiterate -0.28 0.14 0.04 -0.56 0.00
Some secondary -0.07 0.07 0.36 -0.22 0.08
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.10 0.12 0.41 -0.32 0.13
Low Pisco 0.12 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.27
High Pisco 0.10 0.11 0.33 -0.10 0.31
Predicted reut at average values 0.11
u Intercept 2.00 0.16 0.00 1.70 2.32
Notes: S.E. clustered at the individual level. The omitted category for age is for those aged 40-50.
The omitted category for education is for those with some primary education.
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Table E.2: CPT Estimates Assuming Heterogeneous Subjects and Fechner Normal Errors
(Restricted Sample: N = 2,650 )
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
rcpti Intercept 0.70 0.11 0.00 0.50 0.92
Female 0.06 0.06 0.32 -0.06 0.19
Young (Age < 40) -0.21 0.09 0.03 -0.39 -0.03
Middle (Age: [50-60]) -0.09 0.08 0.28 -0.26 0.07
Old (Age > 60) -0.03 0.08 0.72 -0.19 0.13
Illiterate -0.12 0.12 0.34 -0.36 0.12
Some secondary educ. -0.15 0.07 0.03 -0.29 -0.01
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.23 0.11 0.03 -0.43 -0.02
Low Pisco 0.07 0.06 0.29 -0.06 0.19
High Pisco -0.06 0.09 0.49 -0.23 0.11
Predicted rcpt at average values 0.59
i Intercept 0.39 0.05 0.00 0.30 0.48
Female -0.03 0.03 0.38 -0.09 0.03
Young (Age < 40) 0.13 0.07 0.05 -0.0001 0.26
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.01 0.04 0.76 -0.07 0.10
Old (Age > 60) 0.01 0.04 0.80 -0.07 0.09
Illiterate -0.02 0.05 0.67 -0.12 0.08
Some secondary educ. 0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.0003 0.15
Skilled (> sec. educ.) 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.28
Low Pisco 0.01 0.03 0.86 -0.06 0.07
High Pisco 0.10 0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.22
Predicted  at average values 0.46
 Intercept 0.66 0.09 0.00 0.50 0.83
Notes: S.E. clustered at the individual level. The omitted category for age is for those aged 40-50.
The omitted category for education is for those with some primary education.
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Table E.3: Mixture Model Estimates: EUT and CPT with Fechner Normal Errors
(Restricted Sample: N = 2,730 )
Variable Expected Utility Prospect Theory
r Intercept 0.42*** 1.14***
Standard Error 0.08 0.03
95% C. Interval [0.26, 0.58] [0.85, 1.42]
 Intercept n.a. 0.27***
Standard Error 0.03
95% C. Interval [0.22, 0.33]
 Intercept 0.29*** 0.71***
Standard Error 0.04 0.04
95% C. Interval [0.21, 0.36] [0.64, 0.79]
 Intercept 0.31***
Standard Error 0.07
95% C. Interval [0.18, 0.44]
n.a.: not applicable.
*** denotes signicance at 1 % level. S.E. clustered at the individual level.
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Appendix F. Extensions: Alternative Error Type and Weighting
Function
F.1 Luce's (1959) Errors
Previous studies have found that risk estimates are sensitive to the errors' specication (e.g., Wilcox,
2008). In this Appendix, we will examine whether this is the case in our sample by estimating an
alternative error type, due to Luce (1959). Luce errors' standard deviation will be denoted as Luce .






1=Luceui +  EULi 1=Luceui ; (22)
which is bounded between 0 and 1, and can thus be used to predict probabilities in its ratio form:
SEULucei = Pr(choosing lottery S). The parameter 
Luce
i
> 0 represents the noise that can be
understood as the deviation from the correct choices. In the limit, when Lucei ! 0, the lottery
choices would reect exactly the dierences in expected utilities of lotteries, and when Lucei !1,
choices would rather be random (and SEULucei ! 0:5). Obviously, when Lucei ! 1, we would be







which is the decision rule under the assumption of Luce standard normal error (i.e., Luce error
with unit variance). The corresponding decision rule under CPT would have the same ratio form,
but with the cumulative prospect utility (CPU ) replacing the expected utility (EU ) shown in the
prior eqn.
The conditional likelihood function under EUT assuming that Luce errors are normally dis-
tributed with variance, (2i)





















where Imi is equal to 1 when S is chosen in row m; and 0 otherwise. Note that since the choice rule
is already in a cumulative probability form, we do not need to assume a particular density function
to transform the values from the choice rule into a [0,1] value, and we therefore simply take logs to
SEULucei to construct the likelihood function. As we did earlier with the Fechner error, we will
estimate risk preferences under the heterogeneous agent case (i.e., with ri = r0 + f [Xi]), where Xi
denotes the individual characteristics.
Furthermore, we will use the corresponding cumulative prospect utility (CPU i) from eqn.[11])
instead of the EU i in eqn.[22] in order to estimate the parameters under CPT.
Tables F.1 and F.2 below show the maximum likelihood estimates under EUT and CPT for
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the homoskedastic Luce errors. In sum, subjects appear moderately risk averse (breut = 0:56 andbrcpt = 0:72), and higher education is negatively correlated with risk aversion in both models.
Moreover, the estimated S-shaped weighting function implies a substantial overweighting of low
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities. These risk parameter estimates are highly
correlated with the ones obtained under the Fechner errors assumption (the correlation coecients
are 0.74 under EUT, and 0.94 under CPT). Lastly, the magnitude of the estimated standard
deviation (bLuce ) is in accordance with prior studies that use the same errors structure (e.g., Holt
and Laury, 2002).
Table F.1: EUT Estimates Assuming Heterogeneous Subjects & Luce Errors
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
reui Intercept 0.75 0.12 0.00 0.52 0.98
Female 0.06 0.08 0.77 -0.09 0.21
Young (Age < 40) -0.15 0.19 0.41 -0.52 0.21
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.08 0.12 0.47 -0.15 0.32
Old (Age > 60) -0.002 0.13 0.99 -0.25 0.25
Illiterate 0.10 0.12 0.44 -0.15 0.34
Some secondary -0.46 0.21 0.03 -0.87 -0.05
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.70 0.19 0.00 -1.08 -0.32
Predicted r at average values 0.56
Luce Intercept 0.49 0.07 0.00 0.36 0.62
N 3,650
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Table F.2: CPT Estimates Assuming Heterogeneous Subjects & Luce Errors
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
rcpti Intercept 0.73 0.12 0.00 0.50 0.96
Female 0.05 0.05 0.25 -0.04 0.15
Young (Age < 40) -0.11 0.10 0.24 -0.30 0.08
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.09 0.07 0.20 -0.05 0.23
Old (Age > 60) 0.15 0.11 0.19 -0.07 0.37
Illiterate -0.18 0.10 0.07 -0.38 0.02
Some secondary educ. -0.16 0.13 0.20 -0.42 0.09
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.41 0.14 0.00 -0.67 -0.14
Low Pisco 0.06 0.07 0.34 -0.07 0.19
High Pisco -0.06 0.07 0.39 -0.18 0.07
Predicted rcpt at average values 0.72
i Intercept 0.45 0.05 0.00 0.35 0.55
Female -0.001 0.04 0.97 -0.08 0.08
Young (Age < 40) 0.08 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.19
Middle (Age: [50-60]) -0.05 0.05 0.29 -0.14 0.04
Old (Age > 60) 0.07 0.13 0.61 -0.19 0.32
Illiterate -0.17 0.16 0.28 -0.48 0.14
Some secondary educ. 0.01 0.06 0.85 -0.10 0.12
Skilled (> sec. educ.) 0.14 0.09 0.13 -0.04 0.32
Low Pisco 0.11 0.09 0.23 -0.07 0.29
High Pisco 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.39
Predicted  at average values 0.54
Luce Intercept 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.29
N 3,650
F.2 Prelec's (1998) Weighting Function
Our limited sample size prevents the estimation of some of the most popular two-parameter weight-
ing functions (Rieger and Wang, 2006; Lattimore et al., 1992; and Prelec, 1998). In addition to
the curvature parameter, these functions allow for the estimation of the \elevation" parameter.
While the curvature alludes to the sensitivity to probability changes, the elevation is referred to
the overall risk aversion, or to how attractive subjects nd gambling (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999).
While we could obtain the parameter estimates without including covariates in the parameter
equations (i.e., estimating an overall parameter for the entire sample), including covariates usually
results in lack of convergence or in large estimated standard errors. For that reason, we will only
estimate a simplied version of Prelec's (1998) weighting function:
wi(p) = expf (  ln p)ig; i;  > 0; (25)
that imposes  = 1:in the prior eqn. To be clear, the parameter  measures the elevation, and , the
curvature. For a given elevation parameter, a lower i < 1 Prelec's function becomes more curved,
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which implies that the function exhibits more rapidly diminishing sensitivity to probabilities near
0 or 1. Further note that as i ! 1, then wi(p)! p, and thus prospect theory will collapse to the
EUT framework.
Table F.3 below reports the maximum likelihood estimates using Prelec weighting function
and the original version of prospect theory (i.e., not dened over cumulative probabilities). In
addition to evidence of moderate risk aversion (evaluated at the covariates mean, bri = 0:44), we
nd evidence of an inverse S-shape weighting function. In the equation for the weighting function
parameter, i, we included education expressed in years in the curvature parameter equation,
because only doing so let this variable enter with a signicant sign in the regression; otherwise
(i.e., expressing education levels with dummy variables), in addition to insignicant coecients,
the standard errors estimated result very large. These results, which validate the existence of an
inverse S-shaped weighting function, should be seen as preliminary, since the parameter estimates
sharply change when we adopt alternative model specications.
Table F.3: CPT Estimates Assuming Heterogeneous Subjects & Fechner Errors
With Prelec Weighting Function
Coecient Variable Estimate Std.Error p-value 95% Conf. Interval
rpti Intercept 0.41 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.68
Female 0.04 0.11 0.72 -0.18 0.26
Young (Age < 40) -0.14 0.15 0.36 -0.44 0.16
Middle (Age: [50-60]) 0.04 0.14 0.74 -0.22 0.31
Old (Age > 60) 0.09 0.17 0.57 -0.23 0.42
Illiterate -0.32 0.28 0.25 -0.87 0.22
Some secondary educ. -0.16 0.13 0.23 -0.41 0.10
Skilled (> sec. educ.) -0.41 0.17 0.02 -0.75 -0.07
Low Pisco 0.17 0.11 0.13 -0.05 0.39
High Pisco 0.36 0.29 0.21 -0.21 0.93
Predicted rpt at average values 0.44
yi Intercept 0.18 0.12 0.12 -0.05 0.41
Female 0.52 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.99
Education in years 0.59 0.02 0.00 0.55 0.63
Predicted y at average values 0.71
 Intercept 2.15 0.18 0.00 1.79 2.51
N 3,650
Note: This weighting function was estimated using the original (not cumulative) prospect theory.
y The coecients on female and education were computed using the Delta method. The original
estimate was  , with  = 1=(1 + exp( )): Similarly, the predicted  was obtained by
plugging the predicted  (computed at the average of female and education) into the prior formula.
Furthermore, we picture the weighting function associated to the value of  = 0:71 in the Figure
4, where we also depict the TK,s (1992) weighting function for the CPT case with Fechner errors
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(reported in Table 3). In choosing one weighting function over another, it would be interesting to
test which one performs better. Such analysis is deferred to future work.
Figure 4: Tversky and Kahneman and Prelec Weighting Functions
With Fechner Errors and Heterogeneous Subjects







Prelec, with h=1 & f = 0.71
Tversky & Kahneman, with  g = 0.54
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